

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents  
(Page )

It was the Soviet Union -- not the Nazis -- which sought the 1939 nonaggression pact that led to Germany's invasion of Poland.

Moscow's price was the secret slicing of Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres.

The Communists completed Poland's destruction and gobbled up Baltic and Rumanian territories even more rapaciously than the Nazis expected.

The Russians repeatedly applauded German conquests in both East and West.

Moscow was even ready to join the "anti-Comintern" Axis if its price was met.

Because Hitler balked at Stalin's price, the Germans, not the Russians, broke off the beautiful friendship.

What the documents did not show was that Nazi Germany's eventual collapse left a vacuum in Eastern Europe which enabled the Soviet Union not only to achieve its original aims there but to far beyond them.

A digest of the documents, together with a chronology of events that surrounded them, follows:

The Headlines, March 14, 1939; Nazi Germany Occupies Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, Completing Destruction of Czechoslovakia begun at Munich.



Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

(Page

Memorandum by Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker,  
State Secretary in German Foreign Office,  
April 17, 1939

The Russian Ambassador (Alexei Merekaloff) stated  
approximately as follows: Russian policy had always moved in a  
straight line. Ideological differences of opinion . . . did  
not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany . . .  
There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with  
us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might  
become better and better.

龍門文書三〇

七二一

卷之二

ドイツのボーランド侵攻を謀ったものは、ナチスではなく、一九三九年の不可侵条約を欲してゐたソヴィエトである。そこで、ソスコーの代はは過音程にナチスとソヴィエトとの二つの暴力に頭に分からずることであつた。

共産主義者は、ボーランドの破壊を完了しナチスが進出したよりも一歩先進の方法を以てバルチック皮ひルーマニア領土を併合した。ロシヤ

國は、ドイツがソ連領東部に於て占めたバルト三国を併合した。そ

スコーは若しその代はが侵入されられるならば反コミンテルン

する決意をへてゐた。

ヒットラーがスター・リンの代はを謀殺せしめたるの波を以て、ドイツ人

ロシヤ人ではないがこの久しき友情の絆を断切つたのであつた。この文書に示されてゐない事實は、ナチスドイツの偏執的崩壊によつて東部ヨーロッパには穴が開き、而して、これがソヴィエト聯邦をして所期の目的を達成のみならず更にそれ以上の進出を可能ならしめたといふ事であつた。並に本文書を中心とする諸事件の年表を附した本文書摘要は次の通りである。

一九三九年三月十四日附。標題。

チナチ、ドイツ、ボヘミヤ・モラヴィア及びスロバキアを占領す。

チコスロバキヤの完全破壊ミュンヘンに始まる。

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Memorandum by Dr. Ernst Woermann, Under  
State Secretary in German Foreign Office,  
June 15, 1939

(The Bulgarian Minister called to report confidentially that Georgei Astakhoff, Russian charge in Berlin, had confided the following:) The Soviet Union faced the present world situation with hesitation. She was vacillating between three possibilities, namely the conclusion of a pact with England and France, a further dilatory treatment of the pact negotiations, and a rapprochement with Germany. This last possibility, with which ideological considerations would not have to become involved, was closest to the desires of the Soviet Union . . . . If Germany would declare that she would not attack the Soviet Union or that she would conclude a non-aggression pact with her, the Soviet Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with England.

緒稿例文書第三〇七二號一。

國務省公表ナチス外務省文書

抜萃一頁一

ドイツ外務次官エルンスト・ウエルマン博士の一九三九年六月十五日附覺書

タコフ氏から左の通り密談があつた旨極秘裡に報告があつた—ソビエツトは世界の現状に面して態度を決し兼ね、次の三の可能性について何れをとらうかと迷つて居る。即ち英佛と協定を結ぶ事、協定の解消する從來のハツキリしない交渉を今後も續ける事及び對獨裁政權の三點である。此對獨裁政權は思想上の話は別としてもソヴェツトの希望に最も近いものである。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Urgent secret Telegram from Count  
Friedrich W. von der Schulenburg,  
German Ambassador to Moscow, June 29,  
1939

I pointed out (to Molotoff) that we would welcome a  
normalization of the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia . . .  
Molotoff replied that . . . the foreign policy of the Soviet  
government was, in accordance with the pronouncements of its  
leaders, aimed at the cultivation of good relations with all  
countries, and this of course applied -- provided there was  
reciprocity -- to Germany too.

外交文書第三〇七二號一。

外務省公表ナチス外務省文書

抜萃一頁

ドイツ外務次官エルンスト・ウエルマン博士の一九三九・  
年六月十五日附覺書

ブルガリア公使來訪ヘルリン駐在ロシア代理大使ゴルキー・アス  
タコフ氏から左の通り密談があつた旨極秘裡に報告があつた—ソビエ  
ットは世界の現状に面して態度を決し、次の三の可能性について  
何れをとらうかと迷つて居る。即ち英佛と協定を結ぶ事、協定の解  
に及する從來のハツキリしない交渉を今後も續ける事及び對獨裁近  
の三語である。此對如後述は思想上の話は別としてもソヴェツトの希  
望に最も近いものである。

若しドイツがソビエットを攻撃しない事又はソビエットと不可侵條約を  
結ぶ事を諦めるならばソビエットは恐らく英<sup>国</sup>と條約を結ぶ事を見合  
せるであらう。

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reciprocity -- to Germany too.

辯護文書三〇七二一D

ナチ外務省文書中國務省布告拔萃  
モスコウ駐在獨逸大使フリードリッヒ W. ノンデル  
シューレンベルグ伯至急秘密電報一九三九年六月二十九日付

（モロトフに對し）獨ソ關係の平常化を歓迎する旨を指摘した  
ところ、モロトフの返答は、。。。ソビエト政府の對外政策は、そのと  
する。而して、此は勿論、ドイツも又吾に對して同様に親善を望む  
れば、ドイツにも適用される、と言ふことであつた。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Most urgent telegram from German Foreign  
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to  
Schulenburg, August 14, 1939

I request that you call upon Herr Molotoff personally and communicate to him the following: The ideological contradictions between National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in past years the sole reason why Germany and the U.S.S.R. stood opposed to each other in two separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two states, and the restoration of cooperation of a new and friendly type . . .

The Headlines, August 16, 1939: German Demands for Danzig and Polish Corridor Threaten German-Polish war.

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

(Page

Very urgent secret telegram from  
Schulenburg, August 16, 1939

(Molotoff states) that the Soviet Government warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations. . . . He was interested in the question of how the German Government was disposed to the idea of concluding a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, and further, whether the German Government was prepared to influence Japan for the purpose of improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations . . . and whether a possible joint guarantee of the Baltic States was contemplated by Germany.

一九三九年八月十六日附

貳

ソヴィエト政局はドイツの國際關係改善の意圖を大いに歓迎する（と  
モロトフが云つてゐる。）・・・・・彼はドイツ政局が對ソ不可侵  
條約締結についてこの程度の意向をもつてゐるか、且又、同政局が日  
ソ關係の改善の爲に日本を動かす用意があるか否か、・・・・又、ド  
イツがバルト諸島の共同保障を考慮してゐるか否か、の問題に興味を  
もつてゐた。

Defense Document 3072-G

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

(Page

Urgent telegram from Ribbentrop  
to Schulenburg, August 16, 1939

The points brought up by Herr Molotoff are in accordance  
with German desires.

公文書 第三〇七二號 G

政府公文ナニスハ御文書故也

( )

一九三九年八月十六日、リツベントロップ  
シユーレンベルグ宛至急報

モロトフ氏の発言は、ドイツの希望に添ふものである。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

(Page

Very urgent secret telegram from  
Schulenburg, August 19, 1939

The Soviet nonaggression pact draft reads as follows . . .  
Both high contracting parties obligate themselves to desist  
reciprocally from any act of violence and any aggressive action  
whatsoever toward each other, or from an attack on each other  
either individually or jointly with other powers . . .  
Postscript. The present pact shall be valid only if a special  
protocol is signed simultaneously.

卷之三〇七二

歐陽公表才千八外祖翁文忠公

一九三九年八月十九日附

國際不可侵條約互換は左記の通りである。

本協定は、専別の審定を加減算化等せられた手続つて効力を生ずる。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent telegram from Adolf Hitler  
to Joseph Stalin, August 20, 1939

I sincerely welcome the signing of a new German-Soviet commercial agreement as the first step in the reordering of German-Soviet relations. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of a long-range German policy. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both states during by-gone centuries . . . I accept the draft of the nonaggression pact that your foreign minister, Herr Molotoff, delivered,

議文書第三〇七二號—I

國務省公表ナテス外務省文書抜萃

第

頁

一九三九年八月二十日附アドルフ・ヒットラー綴ヂヨセフ・スターリン宛至急電

獨ソ新通商貿易の締結は獨ソ關係調整の第一歩として示の衷心から喜ぶ處である。ソビエット不可侵貿易を結んだ事は宗にとつては長期に亘る我國策の確立を意味するものである。ドイツは之によつて過去數世紀間兩國にとつて有益でのつた政治的常道を回復した譯である。一余は貴國外相モロトフ氏の手交せられた不可侵貿易草案を受諾する。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

(Page

Very urgent secret telegram from  
Stalin to Hitler, Aug. 21, 1939

The assent of the German Government to the conclusion  
of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating  
the political tension and for the establishment of peace and  
collaboration between our countries.

The Headlines, August 23, 1939: Germany and Russia  
sign Nonaggression Pact

辯護文書第三〇七二號-3

國務省公報ナチス外務省文書 坂 草

第

頁

一九三九年八月二十一日付スターリン及

ヒツラ一通報秘至尙電

ドイツ政府が不可侵條約の締結に同意せられた事は貴我兩國間の政治的緊迫  
が除き和平と協力とを確立する基礎となるものである。

景  
一九三九年八月二十三日附  
「獨ソ不可侵條約に署名す」

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very secret memorandum of conversation  
between Stalin, Molotoff, and Ribbentrop,  
in Moscow, August 23, 1939

The Reich foreign minister observed that the anti-Comintern pact was basically directed not against the Soviet Union but against the Western democracies . . . . Herr Stalin interposed that the anti-Comintern pact had in fact frightened principally the City of London and the small British merchants. The Reich foreign minister concurred and (quoting a joke among Berliners, added:) "Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern pact" . . . .

Herr Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fuhrer, as follows: "I know how much the German nation loves its Fuhrer; I should therefore like to drink to his health" . . . . Herren Molotoff and Stalin drank repeatedly to the nonaggression pact, to the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation . . . . Herr Stalin addressed to the Reich foreign minister words to this effect: "The Soviet Government takes the new pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner."

ナニハリシ

三

一九三九年八月二十三日モハコー在於するスターリン、モロトフ及び  
リツペントコツブ宣傳の「ソ連はドイツ國が勝利したが故に  
的になソヴィエト共和國を侵襲としたものではなく、ヨルモク主導國  
を謀殺としてゐる」——と述べた。

スターリン氏は万が遠征軍、主としてロンドン市とイギリスの小  
島は愛島を襲撃したと宣傳せんが、ドイツ山の勝利をも  
て反撃し、（ベルリン人の謀殺でいなれてゐる）  
「シリンは今大勝利を冠しての勝利でせり」とつけた。

スターリン氏はヨルモクの勝利の報道の事を述べた當つて次の様に  
いつた。「ソ連ドイツ」氏が如何に彼等の勝利を喜んでゐるか頃つて

るまで、それで私は彼の前に就坐したひとときます」――――  
モロトフ氏とスターリン氏は不可侵條約の爲、朝ソ連邦の當時代の無  
交ドイツ氏の無何間も益を秘した――――――  
スターイン氏は下記の如き要旨の事をドイツ外務大臣に告した。即ち  
「ソヴィエト政府は新條約を非常に重大に考へる同政府はソヴィニト  
連邦共和国はその相手國を義理らないといふ誓言を保證する事が出來  
るであらう。」

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Secret additional protocol to German-Russian nonaggression pact, signed in Moscow by Ribbentrop and Molotoff, August 23, 1939

In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. . . . (In Poland) the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments . . . . With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia (the northeastern province of Rumania).  
The Headlines, September 1, 1939: War! Nazis Invade Poland. Two Days Later, Britain and France Declare War on Germany.

Exn,

Def, Doc#5072-L

辯護側文書三〇七二一 L

(一頁)

國務省公表ナチス外務省文書抜萃

一九三九年八月二十三日モスコーに於てリツベン・トロツブ、モロト  
フの署名せる獨蘇不可侵<sup>立</sup>約秘密附屬議定書

バルチック諸國（フィンランド、エストニア、ラトビヤ、リトニア）に屬する地域に於ける領土上政治上の再整備の場合には、リ  
トニア北部國境線は獨ソ勢力圏の境界線を示すものとする。  
（ボーランドに於ては）獨ソ勢力圏は略々ナル川、ビストラ川  
サン川の線で限られる。兩當事國の利害に基き獨立ボーランド國を  
維持する事が果して望ましいかどうかと云ふ事又斯くの如き國には  
如何なる國境線が引かれるべきかといふ問題は將來の政治的發展の

経過に於てのみ明瞭に決定され得る。東南ヨーロッハに關してソ  
ヴィエトはそのベッサラビア<sup>ルーマニア</sup>、東北地方<sup>支那</sup>に於ける權益に注目すべき  
である。

標題 一九三九年九月一日附 戰爭。

ナチス、ボーランドを侵略す、二日後、英佛は獨乙に宣戰を布告す。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent telegram from Schulenburg,  
September 9, 1939

I have just received the following telephone message  
from Molotoff: "I have received your communication regarding  
the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my  
congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government."

機 諸 例 文 書 三〇七二一  
國務省公表 ナチス外務省文書

拔萃

シユールンベルグ  
至 感

一九三九年九月九日

余は今左記モロトフよりの電話通信を受信した。『余は蘇聯のワルリイ侵入にてする賃借の通知を受取つた。ドイツ聯邦共和国政府に余の祝詞と挨拶を傳達されんことを乞ふ』

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent, strictly secret telegram  
from Schulenburg, September 10, 1939

(Molotoff) stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians (living within the old Polish borders).

總理文書三〇七二一  
財務省公表 ナチス外務省文書  
抜萃 一  
頁一

シユーレンベルグ發至急極秘電報

一九三九年九月十日

モロトフはソヴィエト政府は、匈軍が更に前進する機會を利用し  
てボーランドは分裂しつつあり、且その結果ソヴィエト聯邦がウクライナ人及び白系ロシヤ人へ西ボーランド國境に在住一を助けることが  
必至となつて來ると、宣言せんと企圖してゐると述べた。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent, strictly secret telegram  
from Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Sept. 15,  
1939

I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotoff at once . . . . "We assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary."

文書三〇七二一〇

公案傳

テス外傳

リツベントロツブ發シユーレンベルグ

卷之三

一九三六年元月十五日  
余は貴下に左記の如くモロトフ氏に直ちに通達するよう懇請する  
「我々はソヴィエト政府が軍事的に加しまして唯今その作戦を講じ  
すると思ふ。我々はこれを歓迎する。ソヴィエト政府は、斯くしてロ  
シヤ領境まで我々がボランド戦闘車を運転し全滅する必要を、我々  
から省いて呉れる。」

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent secret telegram from  
Schullenburg, September 17, 1939

Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night . . . . and  
declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet (Polish) border  
this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line.

The Headlines, September 17, 1939: Red Army Invades  
Poland, Completing Her Destruction.

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國務省公報ナチス外務省文書抜粋  
シユーレンベルグ駐至急秘密電報

一九三九年九月十七日

スター・リンは夜中の二時余を終見した。  
そして赤軍は今朝六時全般にわかつてソヴィエト（ボーランド）國境を  
越するでめらうと云した。  
一九三九年九月十七日附  
赤いボーランド矢を入り、之を完全に  
に崩表せしむ

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent, strictly secret telegram  
from Schulenburg, Sept. 25, 1939

Stalin stated . . . he considered it wrong to leave an independent Polish rump state. He proposed (that) all the Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania. . . . If we consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the protocol of Aug. 23 and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German Government.

辯護側文書三〇七二一Q

國務省發表ナチス外務省文書 拠

萃

一九三九年九月二十五日

一  
頁一

ミユーレンベルグ發至急極秘電報

一九三九年九月二十五日

スター・リンは敗殘ボーランド獨立國を其のままにして置くことは誤りであると述べた。彼はルブリン地方全部及びバクに反ぐワルソ一地方の一部を我々に割譲されるべきであると讒謗した。その代り我々はリトアニアに對する我々の主張を撤回すべきである。若し我々が同意すれば、ソヴィエト邦は直ちに、八月二十三日の議定書に従つてバルヂツク諸國同道の解決策を講ずるであらうし、この問題に關してドイツ政府の畏りない援助を期待する。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Declaration of the German and Russian  
Governments by Ribbentrop and Molotoff  
September 28, 1939

(After partitioning Poland and allotting Lithuania to  
Russia in accordance with Stalin's proposal above, the two  
governments) mutually express their conviction that it would  
serve the true interests of all peoples to put an end to the  
state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side  
and England and France on the other . . . . Should, however, the  
efforts of the two governments remain fruitless, this would  
demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for  
the continuation of the war, whereupon (Germany and Russia) shall  
engage in mutual consultations (on) necessary measures.

辯護側文書三〇七二一R

國務省發表ナチス外務省文書 技 草

リツベントロップ、セロトフによる

ドイツ及ロシヤ政府の宣言

一九三九年九月二十八日

ヘボーランドを分割し、上記スター・リンの提案に従ひロシヤにレトニアを割譲しを後て、兩國政府は一相互に、一方ドイツ他方イギリスフランス間に現存する戦争状態に終止符を打つことはもべての国民の眞の利益に役立つであらうといふ所信を披瀝した。併し若し兩國政府の努力が無益であつたら、この事はイギリス及びフランスは戦争繼續の責任者であるといふ事實を證明するであらう。ここに於てヘドイツとロシヤは必要な方策につき相互協議をなす。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Confidential letter from Ribbentrop  
to Molotoff, Sept. 28, 1939

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter (stating) "that the government of the U.S.S.R. is willing . . . . to promote by all means the trade relations and the exchange of goods between Germany and the U.S.S.R." . . . . The German Reich in turn will take the necessary steps for this purpose.

總理文書 三〇七二一 s

歐美公報ナチス外務省文書  
リツベントロツブよりモロトフ宛題

一九三九年九月二十八日

余は左記内容の實驗を受手した。  
ハ門ら一「ソヴィエト邦共體國政府は進んで——ソ聯の經濟關係  
及び物資交換を是非共促進させろ」——  
ドイツ邦共體國政府は次この目的の爲に必要な方策を講ずるであらう

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent, strictly secret telegram  
from Schulenburg to Ribbentrop,  
March 30, 1940

All our observations . . . . confirm that the Soviet Government is determined to cling to neutrality in the present war and to avoid as much as possible, anything that might involve it in a conflict with the Western powers. This must have been one of the main reasons why the Soviet Government broke off the war against Finland.

The Headlines. April 9, 1940: Germany Overruns Denmark and Attacks Norway, Beginning Conquest of the West.

辯護側文書三〇七二一〇

外務省公表ナチス外務省文書

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頁リツペントロップ宛・ミーレンベルギよりの  
至簡祕密電報

我方ハ調査は全てソヴィエト政体は現在の戦争に於ては中立を固守する  
こと、又出来ざる限り西部諸國との衝突にソヴィエト政体が巻込まれるや  
うな事は避けることに決定したと臆認する。これは何故ソヴィエト政体がフ  
インランドに対する我々の中止したのかといふ主なる理由の一つであつたにち  
がひない。

標 一九四〇年四月九日  
ドイツはデンマークを蹂躪しノルウェイを攻撃し、西部征復を開始す。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent, secret telegram from  
Schulenburg, April 9, 1940

(After being informed of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway) Molotoff declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English . . . . had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In conclusion, Molotoff said literally: "We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures."

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譲文書三〇七二

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外務省公文書に附する大蔵省公表

文書よりの抜萃  
頁

シユーレンブルブル至急秘傳電報

一九四〇年四月九日

上述のデンマーク及ノルウェー使領の通報ありたる後、ソ連政府は、  
トフは宣言した。逸が採らざるを得ざるに勤つた手業を了結するとの口  
述は、中立國の權利を完全に無視した。  
手業として、ソロトフの言つた言葉通りを認せば、  
於て完全な成功を収める事を希望する。  
「我らは、彼がその

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Memorandum from Schulenburg, April 11, 1940

For some time we have observed in the Soviet Government a distinct shift which was unfavorable to us (with regard to visas, German nationals, naval bases, and oil and grain shipments).

I suspect that the tremendous clamor of our enemies and their sharp attacks on neutrals -- particularly on the Soviet Union -- and on neutrality in general were not without effect upon the Soviet Government, so that it feared being forced by the Entente into a great war for which it was not prepared. (But a conversation with Molotoff April 9 revealed) that the Soviet Government had again made a complete about-face . . . . Herr Molotoff was affiability itself, willingly received all our complaints and promised relief. . . . I was completely amazed at the change. In my opinion there is only one explanation for this about-face: our Scandinavian operations must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously.

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent telegram from Schulenburg,  
June 18, 1940

Molotoff . . . expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German armed forces. Thereupon, Molotoff informed me of the Soviet action (of military occupation) against the Baltic States. He added . . . that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.

The Headlines, June 22, 1940: Collapse of France Leaves Britain Alone Fighting Germany.

翻譯文書第三の七二號 一 ▷

頁  
ナチ外務省文書に關する圓滿省公表よりの摘要

シユーレンブルグ急報

一九四〇年六月十八日

モロトフは・・・獨乙陸軍の大勝利に對してソ聯政府の深厚なる祝辭を述べた。更にモロトフはバルト諸國に對するソヴィエトの行動へ手書占領に関する一について余に語つた。彼はバルト諸國に於ける獨乙とソ聯の間に不和と疑惑の種を尋かうとしたと附け加へた。見てある英國及びフランスのすべての陰謀を起つ事が必要となつて來に見出し、一九四〇年六月二十二日、フランスの側娘は英國をして早乙と號ふことを余憾なくす。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent telegram from Schulenburg,  
June 23, 1940

Molotoff made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to Bucovina, which had a Ukrainian population.

解説文書 第三〇七二號—X  
ナチ外務省文書に關する國務省公文よりの抜粋

シユーレンブルグ報　至急報  
一九四〇年六月二十三日  
モロトフは本口余に率し左の如く述べた。  
即ちベサラビアン問題の解決は、これ以上の遷延を許さない。ソヴィエト政府は尙も平和的解決に努力してゐる。しかし、モルトマニア政府が平和的解決に反對するならば兵力を用ひる事に決定してゐる。又同様にソヴィエトの要求は、ウクライナ人の住むブコヴィナに充擴される。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent secret telegram from  
Schulenburg, July 13, 1940

On instructions from Stalin, Molotoff gave me a memorandum of this conversation (between Stalin and Sir Stafford Cripps, then British Ambassador to Moscow). Cripps (said): The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany . . . The British Government was of the opinion that unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of the Soviet Union . . . The interests of the Soviet Union in the (Turkish) Straits must be safeguarded.

Stalin's answers are given as follows: . . . He did not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be engulfed by Germany . . . Stalin was not of the opinion that Germany military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany . . In Stalin's opinion no power had the right to an exclusive

Defense Document 3072-Y

role in the consolidation and leadership of the Balkan countries. The Soviet Union did not claim such a mission either . . . The Soviet Union was in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits.

辯護文書第三〇七二一

ナチ外務省文書に關する國務省公表よりの抜萃

シルーレンブルグ發至急報

一九四〇年六月十三日

頁

當時のモスコ一駐劄英國大使スタンオード、クリツブス卿との間に  
交はされた一の覺書を手交した。クリツブスへ曰く一、英國政府は  
獨乙が、歐洲の政治的支配権獲得に努力してゐる事並びに全歐洲諸  
國を其の掌中に收める欲望を持つてゐる事を確認した。此は、英國  
にとつてもソ聯にとつても同様危險な事である。それ故兩國は獨乙  
に對する自衛の爲に共同政策を探る事を協定しなければならぬ。  
英國政府は現狀維持の爲にバルカン諸國の統一と之が指導とは正し  
くソ聯のなすべき仕事であり。又トルコ一海峽に於けるソ聯の

利益は、保障されねばならない、と云ふ意見である。  
如何なる國が政治的支配権を握るが如き危險は存在しまして、  
獨乙によつて、歐洲が其の掌中に握られる様な危險は無いと見てゐ  
る。。。スター・リンは獨乙陸軍の勝利がソ聯及びソ聯と獨乙との  
友好的關係を恐成するものではないといふ意見である。  
スター・リンの意見は如何なる國もバルカン諸國の團結と指導に關し  
て獨占的役割を演ずる権利を持たない。ソ聯はそのやりな使命の要  
求もしない。。。  
ソ聯は海峽に関するトルコの獨占的支配権に反対するといふのであ  
つた。

Excerpt from State Department Publication  
of Nazi Foreign Office Documents

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Very urgent secret telegram from  
Schulenburg, Sept. 1, 1940

(Commenting on the Hitler-Mussolini arbitration redrawing the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier, Molotoff said;) This violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances the Soviet Government had received from Germany regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The present case involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, where she naturally had interest.